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Ms. Mary Noonan
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Dear Ms. Noonan:
Re:

iw

State v. John Quas
Case No. 890601-CA

I am writing this letter pursuant to Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24 (j), in an effort to follow through with
comments made during oral argument yesterday in this case.
As indicated at oral argument, I am enclosing copies of
two cases in support of the assertion that defense counsel's
filing the motion to quash the bindover order in the district
court was a reasonable action at that time, and should not be
construed as a waiver of the bindover issue. Heninger v. Ninth
Circuit Court, 739 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1987), is the case relied on
by defense counsel at trial, for the proposition that the
district court had jurisdiction over quashal of the bindover, as
part of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Boggess v. Morris,
635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981), discusses the breadth of the common law
extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
As indicated yesterday, defense counsel's assertion of
the Heninger case is recorded in the transcript of the pretrial
motions, on page 7. I am enclosing a copy of her discussion of
the issue.

Ms. Mary Noonan
August 31, 1990
Page Two

At oral argument, I indicated probable agreement with
Judge Orme,s characterization of my argument as one advocating a
prospective, rather than retroactive, application of State v.
Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 1990). As authority for this
argument, I am attaching a copy of State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d
1100 (Utah 1977). Mr. Quas relies on the following language,
appearing on page 1102 of that decision:
If there is to be such a change in the law, whether by
legislative act or by judicial decision, it seems that
it should have only prospective effect and that fairness
and good conscience require that it should not be
applied retroactively to adversely affect rights as they
existed at the time a particular controversy arose.
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HALL, C J , STEWART, A.CJ., and
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

H.C. HENINGER and Doris W.
Heninger, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF
UTAH, WASHINGTON COUNTY, St.
George Department, and Robert F.
Owens, Circuit Judge, Defendants and
Appellants.
No. 20976.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 9, 1987.

1. Bail <s=*77(l)
A bond forfeiture is reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, but, standing
alone, the order is not appealable.
2. Courts <3=>207.1
Bondsmen were entitled to petition for
extraordinary writ to review bond forfeiture rulings of circuit court based on failure of defendants to pay fines in drunk
driving proceedings, since no appeal of underlying convictions was sought, and no
direct appeal of forfeiture orders was thus
available.
3. Courts <s>207.1
Elimination by statutory amendment
of supervisory control of district court over
circuit courts did not curtail constitutional
authorization for district court's issuance
of "all extraordinary writs," and district
court was authorized thereunder to issue
extraordinary writ reversing circuit court's
forfeiture of bail bonds and enjoining circuit court's revocation of bondsmen's bonding authority. U.C.A.1953, 78-1-1 et seq.,
78-3-4; Const Art 8, §§ 1 et seq., 5.

Bondsmen brought petition for extraordinary writ for review of order of 4. Bail <*=>75.2(2)
Statute extending liability of bondscircuit court forfeiting bonds in drunk driving cases, based on failure of defendants to men for defendants' appearances "up to
pay fines, and for writ of prohibition bar- and including surrender of the defendant in
ring enforcement of revocation of their execution of any sentence imposed" extendbonding authority. The Fifth District ed bondsmen's liability beyond imposition
Court, Washington County, J. Harlan of sentence to point of defendants' appearBurns, J., granted summary judgment in ing and surrendering themselves to serve
favor of bondsmen, holding that bonds their sentences. U.C.A.1953, 77-20-7(1).
were exonerated at time of sentence and 5. Bail «=>75.2(2)
that bondsmen were entitled to notice and
Bondsmen were liable under bond for
hearing on revocation of bonding authority.
court appearances of drunk driving defendAppeal was brought. The Supreme Court,
Howe, J., held that (1) bondsmen were ants to point of defendants' surrender to
entitled to proceed by petition for extraor- serve their jail sentences, but bonds were
dinary writ; (2) bonds were exonerated at thereafter exonerated as to defendants,
time of surrender for execution of sen- with exception of one defendant who failed
tence, where no further appearances by to appear for execution of sentence, and
defendants were required, except as to one bondsmen were not liable for forfeiture of
defendant who failed to appear for execu- bonds upon subsequent failure of defendtion; and (3) bondsmen were entitled to ants to pay fines during their periods of
notice, hearing and reasoned explanation of probation. U.C.A.1953, 77-20-7(1).
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nation of court's decision prior to revocation of their bonding authority.
David L. Wilkinson and Diane Wilkins,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
Gary Pendleton and Paul Graf, St.
George, for plaintiffs and respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
This is an appeal of a summary judgment
granted by the Fifth District Court on a
petition for an extraordinary writ In
granting the writ, the district court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court's forfeiture
of four bail bonds and enjoined the circuit
court's revocation of respondents' bonding
authority.
Respondents H. C. and Doris Heninger
were authorized bondsmen for the Ninth
Circuit Court They filed undertakings of
bail with that court in four separate drunk
driving cases. Each of the defendants
pleaded guilty and were sentenced to sixty
days in the county jail and to pay a fine and
a surcharge. In each case, fifty-eight days
of the sentence were suspended and the
defendant was put on probation. Three of
the four defendants surrendered themselves to the Washington County Jail to
serve the remaining two days. The fourth
failed to appear for execution of the sentence. Not one of the four defendants paid
the fine.
Bond forfeiture hearings were held, and
all four bonds were forfeited. The circuit
court ruled that the bonds continued in
force during probation until all terms of
the sentences had been satisfied. Respondents sought review of the forfeiture order
in Fifth District Court by extraordinary
^rit They also sought a declaration of the
duration of a bondsman's liability. The
day after respondents' petition was filed,
the circuit judge sent a letter to the Washington County sheriff instructing him to no
longer accept bonds from respondents.
Respondents amended their petition to seek
* writ of prohibition barring enforcement
of the revocation of their bonding authority.

On motion for summary judgment, the
district court held that an order revoking
respondents' bonding authority was prohibited unless and until they were provided
notice of the basis for the revocation and
were given a full hearing on their qualifications to act as bondsmen in the circuit
court The court further decreed by way
of declaratory judgment that the obligation
of a bondsman is fulfilled by the production
of the defendant at all times required by
the court, up to and including the imposition of sentence, at which time the bond is
exonerated by operation of law. Based on
this reasoning, respondents were released
from liability on the four bonds.
[1,2] The first issue is whether the district court erred in granting extraordinary
relief. Appellants maintain that the proper
avenue for relief would have been by direct
appeal of the forfeiture ruling to the district court, and since respondents did not
lodge such an appeal, they should have
been precluded from seeking extraordinary
relief. This argument must fail. Under
our case law, a bond forfeiture order is
reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, but standing alone, the order is not
appealable. People v. Tremayne, 3 Utah
331, 3 P. 85 (1884). Where no appeal of the
conviction was sought and no direct appeal
of the forfeiture order was thus available,
the district court did not err in allowing
respondents to proceed by petition for an
extraordinary writ.
[3] Appellants also claim that the district court improperly exercised supervisory power over the circuit court by issuing
the writ Both article VIII of the Utah
Constitution (the judicial article) and title
78 of the Utah Code (the judicial code) have
undergone substantial revisions since this
action was filed. Among the many amendments that have been made, the language
specifically granting the district court supervisory control over inferior courts was
eliminated from article VIII and title 78.
Appellants argue that the elimination of
that language prevents the district court
from granting the extraordinary relief
sought in this case. We do not agree.
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commenced, the district court clearly had
power to issue extraordinary writs. Nothing in the amendments to the judicial article of the constitution or the judicial code
stripped the court of that power. The power of the district court to issue "all extraordinary writs'1 is found in the language of
the constitution and statutes both prior and
subsequent to the recent amendments.
The elimination of the "supervisory control" language was made in preparation of
the shifting of direct appeals of circuit
court judgments from the district court to
the court of appeals. However, eliminating
the supervisory control of the district court
over circuit courts does not curtail the exercise of powers granted the district court,
by constitutional provision (article VIII,
section 5) and statute (Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3-4 (1987)), to issue "all extraordinary
writs/'
[4] Appellants next contend that the
district court misread Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-20-7(1) (1982), which defines the duration of liability on an undertaking of bail.
It provides:
The principal and the sureties on the
written undertaking are liable thereon
during all proceedings and for all appearances required of the defendant up
to and including the surrender of the
defendant in execution of any sentence
imposed irrespective of any contrary provision in the undertaking.
(Emphasis added.)
The district court in the declaratory judgment portion of its order held that "the
obligation of the bondsman is fulfilled by
the producing of the person . . . up to and
including the time of sentence and that the
bail bond is exonerated upon the imposition of the Court's sentence." (Emphasis
added.) This interpretation of the above
statute is in error. The statute extends
liability for all appearances "up to and including surrender of the defendant in execution of any sentence imposed." This
phrase clearly indicates an intent to extend
liability beyond the imposition of sentence.

[5] Appellants urge that all the terms
of the sentence, including pajnnents of any
fine imposed, and any other terms of probation must be fulfilled before the bond is
exonerated. We disagree. City of Atlanta v. Turner, 8 Ga.App. 213, 68 S.E. 847
(1910), is illustrative of the problem in the
instant case. There the defendant was sentenced to one week on the chain gang and.
to pay a fine. He served the sentence but
failed to pay the fine. In affirming the
lower court's refusal to order forfeiture of
the bond, the Georgia Court held that "the
prisoner having personally appeared and
surrendered himself into custody for punishment in accordance with the sentence,
the bondsman was discharged from further
liability. The other obligor, the prisoner,
remains liable for the fine."
If a defendant is sentenced to incarceration and ordered to surrender himself at a
particular time and place to a court-designated authority, the bond remains in force
to assure "surrender in execution of sentence." However, the bondsman is liable
only for "all appearances required of the
defendant." He is not liable for payment
of the defendant's fine, nor is he liable for
the defendant's fidelity to the terms of his
probation. While the bondsman is given
power to arrest the defendant in order to
insure his appearance, he is not given pow:
ers that would allow him to enforce payment of a fine or coerce particular behavior
required by the terms of probation. Where
no further appearance is required of the
defendant, the bondsman has fulfilled his
contractual and statutory obligation and is
entitled to exoneration of the bond.
In the instant case, when defendants
Samuel Benally, Jonathan Marshall, and
Dennis Ashcroft appeared and served their
two-day sentences, the bondsmen were entitled to exoneration of the bonds since
those defendants appeared "in execution of
sentence."
Conversely, when Jeffrey
Greening failed to appear as required by
the court, his bond was properly forfeited.

*.*.•*** • i • A£TKJum> JL
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takings of bail in their courts. In the exer- brought action against former owners and
cise of that power, appellants argue, notice one of former owner corporation's judgof and hearing on the revocation of respon- ment creditors after he discovered the
dents' bonding authority was not required. judgment creditors claimed to have judgWe disagree. The inherent power of the ment lien on property. The 3rd District
court to authorize and regulate bondsmen Court, Salt Lake County, Scott Daniels, J.,
should be exercised in a fair and open dismissed complaint against all defendants,
manner, avoiding any appearance of arbi- and property owner appealed. The Court
trariness. This can only be accomplished of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that (1) judgby notice to affected persons, giving them ment creditors had valid judgment lien to
an opportunity to be heard, and a reasoned extent of 30% of undivided one-third interexplanation of the court's decision. Any est in parcels described in deed from forprocedure short of this could adversely re- mer owner to corporation, and (2) former
fleet upon the judiciary and its processes, owner who deeded land to debtor corporaWe hold that the circuit court abused its tion was not liable to new owner in amount
discretion in not providing notice and hear- equal to judgment lien.
ing prior to termination of respondents'
Affirmed.
bonding authority. We consequently afGreenwood, J., concurred in result
firm that part of the summary judgment
only.
barring termination of respondents' bonding authority without notice and hearing.
We reverse that part dealing with bonds1. Judgment G=>793(1)
man's liability. The order exonerating the
Judgment creditors of corporation had bonds is also reversed and remanded with
directions to exonerate only the bonds of valid judgment lien to extent of 30% of
Benally, Marshall, and Ashcroft, who ap- undivided one-third interest in parcels of
property, one third of which had originally
peared to serve their jail sentences.
been deeded in three equal shares of equal
owners of corporation, after one owner
HALL, C.J., STEWART, Associate
CJ., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, deeded his interest back to corporation.
JJ., concur.
2. Judgment ^793(1)
( O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

Alan D. FRANDSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
C. Don HOLLADAY, Ben Timmons,
Keith Biesinger, The Mobile Home Lot,
Inc., Estell Corporation, Inc., Max
Laub and Eva Lou Laub, Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 860069-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 10, 1987.
Part owner of parcel of real property

Former owner of portion of land who
conveyed interest in property to corporation, thus subjecting property to judgment
lien against corporation, was not liable to
subsequent purchaser of land in amount
equal to judgment lien based upon failure
to inform purchaser of existence of lien,
though former owner did not file answer to
action, where default judgment against him
was never entered, and owner, with his
attorney, proceeded to trial without giving
indication that appearance was limited in
scope nor was objection made to court's
lack of personal jurisdiction, and causes of
action were dismissed.
Alan D. Frandsen, Salt Lake City, pro se.
Bryan C. Robinson, (appeared for oral
argument onlv). Salt IAICP fKtv f™« J^^^A
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Walter Preston BOGGESS, Jr., Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Lawrence MORRIS, Warden, Utah State
Prison, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16894.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 20, 1981.
Appeal was taken from an order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay
E. Banks, J., which granted defendant's
writ of habeas corpus, which released him
from custody and vacated his manslaughter
conviction. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J.,
held that where facts proven at hearing on
defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus established that defendant, a convicted
felon, had been denied his constitutional
right to appeal his conviction within time
prescribed by law, the Supreme Court
would issue common-law writ of certiorari
to bring up the record and allow defendant
a direct review of alleged evidence in his
trial for manslaughter just as if he had
taken an appeal within the statutory period
and the Supreme Court would vacate order
of district court granting defendant's writ
of habeas corpus, releasing him from custody and vacating his conviction subject to
reprosecution.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Criminal Law <$=> 1077.3
Unless relieved by court, appointed
counsel is responsible to continue his or her
representation through appeal if defendant
requests an appeal before statutory time
has expired, unless counsel, after a conscientious examination, finds the appeal to be
wholly frivolous and, in that event, counsel
must nevertheless pursue the procedure
outlined in Anders v. California.
2. Habeas Corpus *=> 113(13)
Where facts proven at hearing on defAnHant'q nptitinn for writ of habeas comus

established that defendant, a convicted felon, had been denied his constitutional right
to appeal his conviction within time prescribed by law, Supreme Court would issue
common-law writ of certiorari to bring up
the record and allow defendant a direct
review on the record of his conviction for
manslaughter just as if he had taken an
appeal within the statutory period and
Court would vacate order of district court
granting defendant's writ of habeas corpus,
releasing him from custody and vacating his
conviction subject to reprosecution. U.C.A.
1953, 76-1-405, 77-59-5; ConstArt 8, § 4.
3. Certiorari <s=»9
Common-law certiorari is a discretionary writ. ConstArt. 8, § 4.
4. Certiorari <e=>9
Supreme Court, in common with all
courts having power to issue writs of certiorari, may exercise a reasonable discretion in
granting or refusing a writ; however, that
discretion must be used sparingly so as not
to undermine legislative authorizations fixing limits on time and manner of appellate
review. ConstArt 8, § 4.
5. Certiorari <s=»ll
Certiorari is available in
pellate court's supervision of
ferior courts, especially in
process of appellate review.
§4.

aid of an apactions of inimplementing
ConstArt. 8,

David L. Wilkinson, Craig L. Barlow, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant
Douglas E. Wahlquist, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent
OAKS, Justice:
The issue in this appeal from the granting of a writ of habeas corpus is whether a
convicted felon who has admittedly been
denied his constitutional right to appeal his
conviction within the time prescribed by
law should have his conviction set aside by
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collateral attack and be released from custody (subject to the state's right to prosecute him in another trial) or whether there
is another, more appropriate, remedy by
which he could have a direct appellate review of the alleged errors at his trial.
Defendant Boggess was charged with
second-degree murder in the shooting of his
wife. After a trial in which he was represented by appointed counsel, a jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of
manslaughter, and he was sentenced on
June 19, 1978, to one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison. On January 3, 1979,
almost seven months later, defendant filed
notice of appeal to this Court (No. 16232),
urging error (1) in the court's failure to
instruct on the lesser included offense of
negligent homicide (as well as manslaughter), (2) in the court's failure to declare a
mistrial because of the alleged bias of one
of the jurors, and (3) in appointed counsel's
ineffective representation at trial by failing
to pursue the two foregoing errors by appropriate requests or motions to the court.
Aside from the cryptic claim in defendant's brief that he had "obtained permission
to file this appeal by writ of habeas corpus
granted December 29, 1978," neither the
parties' briefs on appeal nor the record
(which contained no mention of a habeas
corpus proceeding) disclosed any facts explaining why defendant's appeal was submitted so far out-of-time. The one-month
period for appeal in criminal cases (U.C.A.,
1953, § 77-39-5) being jurisdictional, this
Court dismissed defendant's appeal without
addressing the merits of his alleged errors
at trial. State v. Boggess, Utah, 601 P.2d
927 (1979).
The record in the current appeal (No.
16894) discloses the following uncontested
facts developed in a hearing at which defendant and his appointed counsel testified.
After his conviction and again at the time
of his sentencing, defendant advised his appointed counsel that he did not want to
appeal. After he arrived at the state pris-

on, defendant changed his mind and desired
an appeal to urge that the jury should have
been instructed on the lesser included offense of negligent homicide as well as manslaughter. On July 11, 1978, defendant
mailed a letter addressed to his trial counsel
in care of the county clerk, asking him to
take an appeal. Forwarded by the clerk,
this letter reached counsel on July 18th, the
day before the time for appeal expired.
Counsel testified that he took no action on
the letter because he felt that his appointment had terminated with the sentencing
because defendant had then advised him
that he did not want to take an appeal, and
because prior to trial, after full explanation
of the alternatives, defendant had approved
his pursuing only the manslaughter alternative (defendant denies this), which the jury
had accepted.
[1] Counsel erred in not filing the notice
of appeal in this case. Unless relieved by
the court, appointed counsel is responsible
to continue his or her representation
through appeal if the defendant requests an
appeal before the statutory time has expired, unless counsel, after a conscientious
examination, finds the appeal to be "wholly
frivolous." In that event, counsel must
nevertheless pursue the procedure outlined
in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,744,87
S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1966), and
followed by this Court in numerous cases.1
[2] Following a hearing on defendant's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
District Court for the Third Judicial District, the court ruled in December, 1978,
that defendant had been denied his right to
appeal and his right to counsel. By stipulation of counsel, the court then entered an
order granting defendant permission to file
an out-of-time appeal and directing him to
return to the district court for further relief
if this Court refused to entertain that appeal.
After defendant's appeal was dismissed
by this Court, defendant returned to the

BOGGESS v. MORRIS
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district court for relief by habeas corpus.
After another hearing solely concerned
with the circumstances surrounding defendant's attempted appeal and without any
review of the alleged errors at his trial, the
court ordered on December 10, 1979, "that
if the Utah Supreme Court does not take
jurisdiction of the substantive merits of an
appeal by petitioner within thirty (30) days
of December 6, 1979, petitioner's Petition
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus will be granted and petitioner will be released from the
custody of the Utah State Prison." This
order also noted that if he was released in
this manner petitioner could be re-prosecuted under the provisions of U.C.A., 1953,
§ 76-1-405. Pursuant to the provisions of
this order, defendant's conviction was vacated and he was released from custody on
January 6,1980. The state has pursued this
appeal (No. 16894) from that order.
Being unable to ignore the manifest denial of defendant's constitutional right to an
appeal from his conviction and to the assistance of counsel in that appeal,2 and having
no authority to grant an out-of-time appeal
to this Court, the district court had no
practical alternative other than to grant the
order appealed from.3 At the same time,
the vacating of a criminal conviction not
shown to be erroneous and the consequent
release of a convicted felon—even subject
to re-trial—is a result that cannot be accepted if there is any practical and legal
alternative. The ends of justice demand
that a convicted defendant have an oppor2.

E. g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87
S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d
811 (1963).

3. An alternate order such as the trial court
granted in this case has been approved and
applied in comparable cases where defendant's
rights to an appeal have been denied. E. g.t
Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206, 71 S.Ct
262, 95 L.Ed. 215 (1951); Pate v. Holman, 341
F.2d 764, 777 (5th Cir., 1965); Patterson v.
Medberry, 290 F.2d 275 (10th Cir., 1961).
In view of the denial of an appeal, the district
court might have used its habeas corpus hearing to review the alleged trial errors on the
merits and, if it found error, to order defendant
released unless a new trial was granted within
a prescribed time. But this course of action

tunity to appeal in timely fashion, but once
the appellate process" has concluded, society's interest in the effectiveness and integrity of the criminal justice system requires
a finality of judgment that should severely
limit repetitive appeals and collateral attacks.4
The odd result produced by the turn of
the habeas corpus merry-go-round in this
case is evident from the positions of the
parties on this appeal: Defendant argues
that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant
him an out-of-time appeal to consider his
claims of trial error on their merits. He
says his release must be affirmed and he
must go free unless the state elects to conduct another trial. The state argues that
this Court should find a way to grant defendant an out-of-time appeal on the merits, suggesting that we apply the unique
California doctrine of "constructive filing"
of the notice of appeal in circumstances
where the defendant did all that he could to
perfect his appeal but the effort fell short
of complying with jurisdictional requirements through the fault or inaction of others or through circumstances beyond his
control.5
We decline to adopt either of these positions. The argument that the courts have
no alternative other than to release a defendant in circumstances where an appeal
has been denied through the inaction of
appointed counsel is particularly unacceptable since it could lend itself to manipulation
by defendant and his counsel (although
would offend the well-settled principle that "a
habeas corpus proceeding is not intended as a
substitute for an appeal [cite] and will not lie in
the absence of a claim of fundamental unfairness in the trial or a substantial and prejudicial
denial of a person's constitutional rights."
Morishita v. Morris, Utah, 621 P.2d 691, 693
(1980); Gentry v. Smith, Utah, 600 P.2d 1007
(1979).
4. See, e. g., Chief Justice Warren E. Burger,
Annual Report to the American Bar Association, Feb. 8, 1981.
5. -Re Benoit, 10 Cal.3d 72, 109 Cal.Rptr. 785,
514 P.2d 97 (1973); People v. Dailey, 175 Cai.
App.2d 101, 345 P.2d 558 (1959); People v.
Slobodian, 30 Cal.2d 362, 181 P.2d 868 (1947).
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there is no such evidence in this case). Fortunately, there are better alternatives,
which further the interests of justice in
promoting the full and fair review of criminal convictions on their merits, minimize
the use of habeas corpus as a collateral
attack upon or as a means of reviewing
alleged errors in a criminal conviction, and
obviate the expense of holding a new trial
where the first trial has not been shown to
be unacceptable.
In State v. Johnson, Utah, 635 P.2d 36,
a companion case, we have held that a claim
that a convicted defendant has been denied
his constitutional right to an appeal should
be presented to the sentencing court by a
motion for postconviction relief under Rule
65B(i), U.R.C.P. If the facts found by the
district court establish that the right to
appeal was denied, that court is then empowered to resentence the defendant nunc
pro tunc upon the previous finding of guilt
so as to afford him an opportunity to prosecute a timely direct appeal from his conviction. That is the appropriate remedy in the
common circumstance where, as in the
Johnson case, defendant's claim is based on
allegations that have not been established
as facts.
In the unusual circumstances of this case,
where the facts have already been established by findings in a habeas corpus proceeding, it would be needlessly circular to
require that defendant return to the district
court to re-establish the facts by a postconviction hearing and then to be resentenced
to qualify for a direct appeal. In this exceptional circumstance, there is a more direct remedy.

common-law writ of certiorari was very
broad, encompassing not just questions of
jurisdiction but aJso a review of the evidence and the regularity of the proceedings
to determine whether the "proceedings
were had in accordance with law," and to
correct "errors in law affecting the substantial rights of the parties." Gilbert v. Board
of P. and F. Comm'rs, 11 Utah 378, 389, 396,
40 P. 264 (1895); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S.
42, 44-45, 65 S.Ct 517, 519-520, 89 L.Ed.
739 (1945); Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [1952] 1 K.B.
338, 346, 348.

Article VIII, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution empowers this Court to issue the
writ of certiorari. This constitutional language refers to the writ defined by the
common law, not the process limited by
various statutory enactments authorizing
specialized uses of the writ of certiorari or
writ of review.6 The scope of review by the

[3-5] Common-law certiorari is a discretionary writ. As this Court observed in
Rohwer v. District Court, 41 Utah 279, 293,
125 P. 671 (1912): "This Court, in common
with all courts having the power to issue
writs of certiorari, may exercise a reasonable discretion in granting or refusing a
writ" That discretion must be used sparingly so as not to undermine legislative
authorizations fixing limits on the time and
manner of appellate review. At the same
time, certiorari is available in aid of an
appellate court's supervision of the actions
of inferior courts, especially in implementing the process of appellate review. As the
United States Supreme Court declared in
McClellan v. Garland, 211 U.S. 268, 279, 30
S.Ct 501, 503, 54 L.Ed. 762 (1910):
While the power to grant this writ [of
certiorari] will be sparingly used, as has
been frequently declared by this court,
we should be slow to reach a conclusion
which would deprive the court of the
power to issue the writ in proper cases to
review the action of the Federal courts
inferior in jurisdiction to this court.
This Court applied that principle in Higgins
v. Burton, 64 Utah 550, 553, 232 P. 917
(1924), where it allowed a writ of certiorari
at the request of the district attorney to
review an order quashing an information
because the lower court's order was not

6. E. g., U.C.A., 1953, §§ 35-1-86 (workmen's
compensation awards), 54-7-16 (public service
commission orders); Utah Revised Statutes,

Compiled Laws, 1917, § 7377, applied in Hilton
Bros. Motor Co. v. District Court, 82 Utah 372,
25 P.2d 595 (1933); Haliowell v. District Court,
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subject to appellate review by any other
means.
At common law, the writ of certiorari
was often used in company with the writ of
habeas corpus to permit a higher court to
review the proceedings of an inferior tribunal.7 Together, it was sometimes said, they
could be used for the same purpose as a
writ of error to review the proceedings of a
court over which the issuing court had appellate jurisdiction.8
In this case, we have a criminal conviction that is no longer subject to review by
the statutory remedy of appeal and a habeas corpus proceeding—properly before this
Court on appeal—which has shown that the
conviction cannot stand without granting
the defendant his constitutional right to an
appeal. In that circumstance, where this
Court has appellate jurisdiction over the
habeas corpus proceeding and original jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari for the
record in the criminal conviction, the effect
of the two writs can unite to open the door
for direct review of a criminal conviction in
this Court.
If available as an alternate means of
appellate review, these two writs could
make a mockery of the time limits for appeal, undermine the finality of criminal
judgments, and promote the indefensible
merry-go-round of collateral attack. That
must not be. We stress that this is not a
case where the alleged error could have
been corrected on appeal.9 The error in this
case goes to the availability of the appeal.
Nor is this a case where the time for appeal
had passed before defendant took the initiative to seek an appeal, so that an out-oftime review would constitute an evasion of
the statutory period for appeal.
In the extraordinary circumstances of
this case, where a timely appeal to this
Court was prevented by circumstances that
7. See generally, D. Oaks, The Original Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962
Sup.Ct.Rev. 153, 182-89; D. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776-1865, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev.
243, 259-60 (1965). As a means of review, the
two writs were complementary. Habeas corpus produced the presence of the prisoner but
not the record; certiorari produced the record

admittedly constituted a denial of defendant's constitutional rights to appeal, we exercise our discretion to issue the commonlaw writ of certiorari to bring up the record
and allow defendant a direct review in this
Court of the alleged errors in his trial for
manslaughter, on the merits, just as if he
had taken an appeal within the statutory
period. The briefs filed by the parties in
No. 16232 are hereby received as the briefs
in this case, with either party to have leave
to supplement them within thirty days.
For the reasons set out above, we also
vacate the order of the district court granting defendant a writ of habeas corpus, releasing him from custody and vacating his
conviction, and remand this habeas corpus
case to the district court for further action
consistent with this opinion.
HALL, C. J., and STEWART and HOWE,
JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments,
but died before the opinion was filed.

Leo DURAN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Lawrence MORRIS, Warden, Utah State
Prison, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 16871.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 21, 1981.
Prisoner filed petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that prison officials viobut not the prisoner. 2 Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 210 (Am.ed. 1847).
8. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571, 5 S.Ct
1050, 1053, 29 L.Ed. 277 (1885).
9. Compare, e. g., Hafen v. Morris, Utah, 632
P.2d 875 (1981).
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Harlan Burns, J., of maintaining a mobile
home as a residence in an unauthorized
zone in violation of city code, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that
where issue whether defendant's constitutional right to counsel was denied by virtue
of trial court's refusal to permit a lay person, not a member of the bar, to represent
him was not raised at trial level, matter
could not be raised for first time on appeal.
Appeal dismissed.

ings was a constitutional issue framed,
presented to the court or ruled upon. However, on appeal here, defendant asserts he
was denied the right to counsel by virtue of
the court's refusal to permit a lay person,
not a member of the bar, to represent him.3
This court has had this issue of right to
appeal before it a number of times 4 and
most recently in State v. Sheldon* Vernal
City v. Critton* and in Salt Lake City v.
Perkins,7 all of which are dispositive.
There having been no constitutional issue
raised in the District Court, the decision of
that court is final and not reviewable here.

Criminal Law <§=> 1035(7)
Where no issue as to whether defendAppeal dismissed. No costs awarded.
ant was denied his constitutional right to
counsel by virtue of trial court's refusal to
ELLETT, C. J , and CROCKETT, MAUpermit a lay person, not a member of the
bar, to represent him was raised at trial GHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
level, matter could not be raised for first
time on appeal. U.C.A.1953, 78-5-14, 7851-25; Const, art. 8, § 9.
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
Gubler, pro se.
John W. Palmer, St. George City Atty.,
St. George, for plaintiff and respondent.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
HALL, Justice:
Defendant appeals a District Court trial
de novo l conviction of maintaining a mobile
home as a residence in an unauthorized
zone in violation of the St. George City
Code.2
The defendant was initially tried and convicted by a jury in the City Court of St.
George, was granted a new trial and was
again convicted after a jury trial.
On the day scheduled for trial in the
District Court defendant appeared pro se,
announced he was prepared to proceed and
the jury trial ensued and concluded with a
conviction. At no time during the proceed-

Defendants were convicted before the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Bryant H. Croft, J., of murder in the first
degree, and they appealed. The Supreme
Court, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d 297, af-

1.

4.

Section 78-5-14, U C A , 1953, Article VIII,
Section 9, Constitution of Utah.

v.
Walter B. KELBACH and Myron D.
Lance, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 15060.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 9, 1977.

Beginning with* Salt Lake City v Lee, 49
Utah 197, 161 P 926

2.

Section 5-7-3, St George City Code.

5. Utah, 545 P 2d 513 (1976)

3.

See Section 78-51-25. U.C.A.. 1953 allowing

fi
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firmed, and defendants appealed The
United States Supreme Court vacated judgment insofar as it left undisturbed death
penalty imposed and remanded case.. The
Supreme Court, 559 P.2d 543, then remanded case to the district court for further
proceedings in accordance with law. On
remand, the district court sentenced defendants to life imprisonment instead of
death, and the State appealed. On motion
to dismiss appeal, the Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that sentence was not
"order made after judgment" from which
State, which had no right to appeal except
as expressly provided by statute, could appeal.
Motion to dismiss appeal granted.
Ellett,. C. J., filed dissenting opinion.

Robert B. Hansen, William T. Evans, William W. Barrett, R. Paul VanDam, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff-appellant.
James R. Soper, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
CROCKETT, Justice:
The state appeals to challenge the propriety of sentencing the defendants to life
imprisonment instead of death upon their
conviction of first degree murder. Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that no
such

aPP^ b y

the state

» authorized by

law.

[1] Defendants argue that the only appeal permitted the state in criminal cases is
as stated in Sec 77-39-4, U.C.A.1953:
L Criminal Law *=> 1024(1)
Appeal by state, in what cases.—An
Sentence of life imprisonment imposed
appeal may be taken by the state:
upon defendants, instead of death, upon
(1) From a judgment of dismissal in
their conviction of first-degree murder, was
favor of the defendant upon a motion to
not "order made after judgment," within
quash the information or indictment
•meaning of statute providing that appeal
(2) From an order arresting judgment
may be taken by state from order made
(3) From an order made after judgafter judgment affecting substantial rights
ment affecting the substantial rights of
hi the state, from which state, which has no
right to appeal except as expressly provided
the state.
by statute, could appeal. U.C.A.1953, 77(4) From an order of the court direct35-1 et seq., 77-39-4.
ing the jury to find for the defendant
See publication Words and Phrases
If we accept defendants' premise: that the
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
only authorization for an appeal by the
state must derive from the above-quoted
Z Courts <&~90(6)
As a general proposition law as estab- statute, the right of appeal must be found
lished should remain so until changed by in subsection (3).
legislature, prerogative of which is to make
The question then arises: whether the
and change the law; however, this does not sentence is "an order made after judgTnean to say that error in judge-made law ment," as distinguished from the judgment
icannot be remedied but rather in such cir- itself. It is true that the jury verdict and
cumstances court undoubtedly can and the judgment entered thereon, whether of
should correct it.
guilty or not guilty, is sometimes spoken of
as "the judgment" in a criminal case.'- If
£ Courts *=> 100(1)
that constituted the whole judgment, then
B Statutes *=>267(1)
Any change in law that state has no the sentence might be regarded as "an orfright to appeal except as expressly provided der made after judgment" But it is also
|or statute, whether by legislative act or by true that until the court acts upon the
judicial decision, should have only prospec- verdict and pronounces sentence upon the
tive, effect U.CJL1953, 77-39-4; Const. defendant there is no burden imposed about
* t 8, § 9,
which to complain and take an appeal. Ao-
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cordingly, it is commonly understood and
accepted that the sentence is that which
aggrieves him and is regarded either as the
judgment or an essential part thereof.
Consistent with this is the manner in which
the term is used in Chapter 35 of Utah Code
Ann. 1953, entitled "The Judgment"
Section 77-35-1 provides:
Time for pronouncing.—After a plea or
verdict of guilty . . . the court
must appoint a time for pronouncing
judgment
. . [i. e., the sentence.]
Further in accord with the idea that the
sentence is not "an order made after judgment" is the statement in our case of State
v. Fedder:l
. sentence is ordinarily synonymous with judgment, and denotes the
action of a court of criminal jurisdiction
formally declaring to the accused the legal consequences of the guilt which he
has confessed or of which he has been
convicted. [All emphasis herein is added.]
We are not aware of, nor have we been
shown, any adjudication to the effect that a
sentence is such "an order made after judgment;" and it does not seem reasonable to
suppose that the appeal allowed in the
above-quoted statute was intended to be to
the sentence imposed, or it could have plainly so stated.
The state makes the alternative argument: that if the quoted statute does not
authorize the appeal, it should be allowed
upon the ground set forth in the dissent in
the case of State v. Davenport,2 by myself
and joined in by Chief Justice Ellett.
Therein I set forth as persuasively as I
could the proposition that the above-quoted
statute is permissive only; and that in any
event it could not supersede the general
grant of the right of appeal under Section 9
of Article VIII of our Constitution. Wherefore, the state should have such right to
correct errors or settle questions of law
whenever it is deemed that the public inter-

[3] But more important than any of the
above is the oft proclaimed salutary principle: that ours is a government of laws and
not of men. Accordingly, the law should
not be changed simply because of the will
or desire of judges as to what the law is or
ought to be. Much less so, should it be so
changed during the course of a particular
proceeding to have a retroactive effect
thereon. Notwithstanding the fact that the
change the state advocates would vindicate,
the position taken in the dissent referred to,
to so rule in this case retroactively would
violate what we regard as a higher principle: that of honoring the established law.
If there is to be such a change in the law,
whether by legislative act or by judicial
decision, it seems that it should have only
prospective effect and that fairness and
good conscience require that it should not
be applied retroactively to adversely affect
rights as they existed at the time a particular controversy arose.4

1. 1 Utah 2d 117, 262 P.2d 753.

4. That such a change is sometimes made and

est so requires. (Absent, of course, considerations of double jeopardy.) However, despite that effort to so persuade this court, it
rejected that proposition and ruled to the
contrary: that is, that the state has no
right to appeal except as expressly provided
in the above-quoted statute.3 It is important to have in mind that that was the
established law of this jurisdiction at all
times material to this case, and when the
sentence complained of was imposed; and
when this appeal was filed.
[2] As a general proposition the law as
established should remain so until changed
by the legislature, whose prerogative it is to
make and to change the law. This does not
mean to say that where there is judge-made
law, which is later observed to be clearly in
error, that such error should be so cast in
cement that it cannot be remedied. In such
circumstances the court undoubtedly can
and should correct it.

Cite as 569P^dllOO

To be mentioned in passing is a question
which has been spoken of as of some concern: does the imposition of a sentence for
life, rather than the death penalty, adversely affect the substantial rights of the state.
However, we do not think it is of controlling importance, but have assumed that it
does, and have set that question aside, in
order to deal with what we regard as more
important problems.
There is a further proposition which we
think has a legitimate bearing upon our
action on this motion: due to the multifaced opinion of the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Furman v. Georgia,5
and subsequent adjudications,6 there has developed a great deal of consternation and
confusion about the death penalty. Other
cases are pending before the courts and it is
not clear what useful purpose could be
served by adding another until the law is
more clearly defined and settled in that
area. Moreover, it appears that these defendants were involved in a series of killings which could hardly have been more
fiendish or diabolical. Without making any
suggestion with respect thereto, it is pointed out that it is up to the officials charged
with that responsibility as to further prosecutions against the defendants, if and when
they think a useful purpose would be served
thereby.
It should be noted that this discussion
deals solely with the motion to dismiss the
state's appeal; and that it does not reach
nor have any relationship whatsoever to the
lawfulness of the defendants' conviction,
which has been heretofore dealt with,7 nor
with the question of the death penalty.
On the basis of the record presented on
this motion and what has been said herein,
53 S.Ct 145, 77 L.Ed. 360, cited in our case of
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384
P.2d 389.

we have concluded to grant the motion to
dismiss the appeal.
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ.,
concur.
ELLETT, Chief Justice, (dissenting).
The opinions of the author in the main
opinion regarding appeals by the state, unlike swiss cheese, do not improve with age.
His dissent in the case of State v. Davenport1 set forth the law correctly and he
should have remained faithful to the correct
principles set forth therein and should not
have changed his vote 'simply because this
Court heretofore made an error.
There should be a better reason for following an erroneous holding than the idea
that once we make an error, it must be
perpetuated until the legislature spends its
time to correct our mistakes. We should
correct our own errors as soon as the occasion arises when we are convinced that an
error has been made. I would allow the
appeal to stand.
Even if the appeal were not permitted by
the constitution,2 the judgment of the district court cannot be allowed to stand. On
January 18, 1977, this Court remanded this
case to the district court "for further proceedings in accordance with the law." 3 I
dissented to the language used in the order
of remand and thought we should tell the
trial judge what the law was. His Honor,
the district judge, was told to proceed in
accordance with law. This he failed to do,
and we should remand to have him comply
with our order.
His failure to act in accordance with the
law stems from the fact that the sentence
to be imposed upon those guilty of murder
7. Conviction affirmed, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P.2d
297.
1. 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P.2d 544 (1973).

5. 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346.
6. Gregg v! Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909,
49 L.Ed.2d 859; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913; Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d
929.

2. Article VIII, Sec. 9 provides: "From all final
judgments of the district courts, there shall be
a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. . ."

3- Utah, 559 P.2d 543 (1977).
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and the first degree was death unless the
jury trying the case made a recommendation of leniency which was not done in this
case. Here, the defendants committed a
series of murders, and after the decision in
Furman v. Georgia4, was handed down,
they appeared on national television and
gleefully admitted the killings, stating that
they would kill more if and when they got
out of prison.
The defendants had been sentenced to be
shot, but the execution date was postponed
by the United States Supreme Court. The
case was remanded by that Court to the
Utah Supreme Court to consider the case in
the light of Stewart v. Massachusetts} Instead of doing that, the majority of this
Court simply remanded the matter to the
district court.
Since Utah has never had a racial problem (only one black man has been executed
in Utah since statehood in 1896), it cannot
be said that we are governed by the Stewart or the Furman cases. Therefore, the
only lawful penalty to be made is that of
death. The trial court should have fixed a
new date for the execution if it proceeded
according to law as it was directed to do.
However, the court did not proceed according to law; it imposed a sentence which
cannot be found in the statutes, to wit: life
imprisonment.
To follow the main opinion in this case is
to let two cold-blooded murderers avoid the
lawful sentence that they were originally
given. If the state is not permitted to
appeal the erroneous sentence imposed, the
matter ends here until the defendants seek
relief by way of habeas corpus on the
ground that there is no penalty under the
law for retaining them in prison. It would
be better to allow the appeal and have a
decision on the matter in the light of the
Stewart case as the Supreme Court of the
United States requested, than to merely
remand for the court to follow the law.
It appears to me that this Court is supinely shirking its responsibility if we let the

sentence stand as made. It is no excuse to
refuse to stand firm on the principles of
this case by saying that the prosecuting
attorney can bring more cases of first degree murder against the defendants/ We
should do our duty, and if any court is to
say that the penalty provided by law in this
case is invalid and that these killers are to
be freed, let it be some court other than our
own.

Jean EHNINGER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Ronald C. EHNINGER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 14878,
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 13, 1977.
Wife sued for divorce. The District
Court, Salt Lake County, Dean E. Conder,
J., granted divorce and awarded $4,000 as
property settlement in lieu of alimony and
husband, appealed. The Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that: (1) although parties
had been married only about a year and
both were employed, award of money to
wife was not improper, where marriage had
been second for husband and first for
younger wife, husband was awarded most
important asset and he had income of
$1,300 per month and wife $500; and (2)
wife was justified in her request for further
award of attorney fee.
Affirmed, but remanded for determination of attorney fee.
Wilkins and Hall, JJ., concurred in result.

